It's funny, so funny.I laugh as a child.not you ???
Perimeter Institute is going to have a nobel prize hihihi with my spheres.it's well ,it's well hihihih
Well well well crazzy I am, I agree.
dear Joy did you know my theory before?
Regards
Steve
don't panic dear I have sent so many mails in so many universities, labs and institutes in the past.We understand why people copy and become crazy with MY THEORY OF SPHERIZATION hihihi buy a t shirt.
Regards
Steve
Dear Joy,
I feel that most criticism against your work is rooted in the unfamiliarity with geometric algebra and the prejudice for status quo. However, not Grangier' criticism. And you are right, geometric algebra is only a tool. In a pure strict mathematical sense, Bell killed von Neuman proof and you killed Bell's proof. But the real debate is on completeness of QM and on local realism in the sense of Einstein. Let me explain.
In QM there are no go theorems for non-contextual hidden variable theories, but they do not apply for contextual HV. But this does not secure contextual HV theories the status of physical theories. Bell is credited for killing Neumann's proof not because of finding an objectionable assumption, but for carying that assumption to its logical conclusion and for discovering his inequality which in the end greatly strenghtened the difference between classical and QM. Should he nevered find the inequalities, his objection would have been ignored in the same way contextual HV theories are ignored today. So I guess that if your objection against Bell's theorem would lead to a strengthened argument either against or for local realism, then your result would replace Bell's result in its social status among physicists. Until then, your result, while mathematically correct, can be easily dismissed a la Grangier by saying that this is not normally what people understand while discussing the usual classical statistics. And he is right. The point of his criticism is on the implied ontology of your result and not on validity of the result itself. When Vietnam war ended, at the peace conference, the US general remarked to his Vietnamese counterpart: you never defeted us in any battle. The Vietnamese replied: true but irrelevant.
So on local classical realism, I think the battle is lost, there is no such thing as local classical realism. Your restoration of local classical realism is only based on the fortunate su(2)~so(3) isomorphism and may only be working in this and a few other isolated cases.
To restore local realism you need to prove that local classical realism is ALWAYS tennable. Only then you can claim you have successfuly killed Bell's theorem (or the ghost of Bell's theorem from physicists' collective psychology). My hunch is that a systematic analasys would reveal a kind of local realism which is far from any generally acceptable classical behaviour. Then this yet to be discovered result will replace Bell's theorem and your analasys would then become similar with Bohm's theory in the role it played. This is what Grangier ment by saying: "So the proposed model [1] cannot be a local realistic model, it could at best be an alternative formulation of quantum mechanics [4], like Bohm's theory is."
On completness of QM, QM is most likely insufficient to describing nature as superselection rules may naturally occur and they have an impact on dynamics. But this is a big open problem at this point. So I guess Einstein was right after all about incompletness. If I am right in the paragraph above, he was right in the letter but not in the spirit.
Back to your original result, I became aware of it 2 years after it was published and I wanted to write a comment on it until I saw Grangier's comment which resonated strongly with my thinking. I was never influenced by him in any way and it was a rather pedantic excercise to write another comment lacking a proof of the ideas which I presented here.
If you may indulge me a bit more, I would make the following old-new comparison: Neumann's theorem-Bell's theorem. Bohm's theory - your result. Bell's theorem-hypothetical new no go theorem closing the loophole you discovered in Bell. GHZ-other exceptional cases besides so(3) for composability.
GHZ basically kills any hope for Bohm's quantum potential as a realistic model for QM as there is no interaction present there. The other exceptional cases in the search for non-unitary realizations of QM may kill the hope for a universal local realistic interpretation of QM, rendering the locally realistic physical interpretation based on so(3) as an isolated case and becoming an objection free no go theorem replacing Bell.
Florin,
There are possible approaches to Christian's treatment of Bell's inequality. One approach, which you have beautifully illustrated above, is to bring all the mathematics at your command to the problem, and hope this answers the question.
Another is based upon physics and physical understanding. Because my theory is local-realistic and qualitatively explains many otherwise unexplained anomalies in today's physics, I have no problem accepting Christian's results, which make sense to me.
I say this knowing it will have no effect upon your approach, but simply to remind everyone tracking this conversation that yours is not the only approach that a physicist can take. Assume for a moment that QM is incomplete, as Einstein said, and as you seem to state: "So I guess Einstein was right after all about incompleteness. If I am right in the paragraph above, he was right in the letter but not in the spirit. "
This being the case, why should quantum mechanics be the be-all and end-all of the problem? If it is incomplete, it is incomplete, and it's century of successes are not to be discounted, but neither are they to be the only parameter by which we judge reality. And a quarter century of 'entanglement' if Bell's inequality is truly incorrect, led to much non-sense, based upon the false interpretation of measurement statistics leading to the conclusion that local realism did not exist.
There are consequences to approaches. Unquestioning acceptance of Bell's inequality has had (if Joy is correct) disastrous consequences. I dare say that these came from the side that respects mathematics above and beyond all physical reasoning. The 'social reality' discussed above has prevented my theory of local realism from being taken seriously by those committed to the non-locality that is the basis of the 'entanglement industry', an industry in which contracts, experiments, papers, publications, and professional status weigh heavily upon 'accepted' version of reality. [God bless fqxi.]
The known 120 orders of magnitude decrease in QED's vacuum energy and the apparent 31 orders of magnitude increase in the strength of gravito-magnetism combine to present physicists with 151 order of magnitude relative change between these energies and potential explanatory power. But have all of the QED calculations since 1947 been recalculated with a realistic vacuum energy? No. Old ideas of virtual particles, despite failure to find the expected 'sea of strange quarks' in the proton, despite the surprise of the 'perfect fluid' at RHIC and LHC when a 'quark gas' was expected, are well entrenched, and no one is being discomforted by the mere physical facts. QED cannot even come within 4 percent of the proton radius, for muonic hydrogen. And QCD has problems getting this close.
"Real anomalies, we don't need no stinkin' real anomalies." Instead, those who happily accept the non-real, non-local as "reality" have gone off into Multi-verses, extra dimensions, holographic extensions, qubits-as-virtual processors, and other fantastic but not-measureable and non-predictive physics. That 151 orders of relative change could actually mean a simplification of physics is not even resisted. It's ignored. No one, apparently, wants physics to be simpler. That a gravito-magnetic-based 'pilot wave' induced by every particle with momentum could actually be meaningful is ignored.
I'm not complaining. Planck said a century ago that "...theories are never abandoned until their proponents are all dead...science advances funeral by funeral." If true, we're in big trouble, since there are too many physicist proponents to all die off, and they are training their replacements.
And, Joy, perhaps you will find some joy in Einstein's statement: "I enjoy it that colleagues occupy themselves at all with the theory, although for the time being with the purpose of killing it..."
The mathematical battles are extremely important, but physics is still based on reality, and, it is my hope and belief that these 151 orders of magnitude changes imply a simpler, and more intuitive reality, one that I try to outline in my essay.
Edwin Eugene Klingman
Dear Florin,
I am sorry, but I fundamentally disagree with almost everything you are saying. To begin with, I do not think you have read what I have written, especially in my latest paper. If you have, then you have not understood the fundamental problem with Bell's very first equation. And since this equation is fundamentally flawed, both Grangier' criticism and the consensus view are also fundamentally flawed. Because Grangier' criticism amounts to resorting back to the first equation of Bell---which means that he never understood my paper. But that is forgivable. Because one can argue that I did not make my position clear in my first paper. But your reliance on Grangier' criticism today is hardly forgivable, because since then I have written six more papers, explained my position many times over, and produced many more explicit calculations to support my claim. To understand my main objection (which also has far reaching implications), I urge you to reread the first two pages of my latest paper. This paper also takes us to the logical consequences of my refutation of Bell's theorem. Namely, that a local-realistic theory must involve all four division algebras (without a devisor local causality cannot be maintained a la Bell), and there is no real distinction between the classical and the quantum apart from an accidental choice of a division algebra (S^0 and S^1 for the "classical" case and S^3 and S^7 for the "quantum" case). The dismissal a la Grangier of my work is thus fundamentally invalid, because it surreptitiously brings us back to the flawed first equation of Bell.
You also keep insisting on the fortunate su(2)--so(3) isomorphism, but that is not the only example I have worked out. That was the first example, and that is enough to restore the EPR conclusion that QM is an incomplete theory of nature. But I have also worked out examples involving the Hardy state and the GHZ states (i.e., 7-sphere). More importantly, my latest paper does not rely on any such special cases. It employs very general and powerful topological theorems to show that *all* quantum mechanical correlations can be understood as local-realistic correlations among the points of the four parallelizable spheres. So I do not accept your point about su(2)--so(3) isomorphism being a special case, on several grounds. In particular, my last two papers prove that local realism is *always* tenable. See especially section VI of 0904.4259. I have showed this two years ago, so I am puzzled about your statements. Moreover, I am writing yet another paper where this point will again be brought out in full generality. The key point again would be the inevitability of using all four division algebras, if the local causality is to be fully respected.
I also do not agree with your interpretation of Grangier's statements. Neither do I agree with your comparison of my results with Bohm's theory. I think such a comparison is red herring. I think you should read my papers 0904.4259 (especially section VI) and 1101.1958 in full before making any such comparison. Grangier made this comparison because he thought my results correspond to a theory that is local but "non-real". This is of course silly. No one who knows geometric algebra would make such a statement. Thus Grangier's critique is a travesty.
Dear Joy,
Indeed, I an not taking your latest paper in consideration yet as I do not want to rush to judgement on a half-understood paper. About the other references, let me re-read your pointed sections and I would comment then.
But let me comment on a most likely wrong statement in your latest paper: "On the other hand, relaxing the composition law (141)...and that would certainly compromizee local causality, because the factorazability condition (52) cannot be maintained within a non-division algebra [Dixon]." Now I have Dixon's book. On what page does he prove that? By means of a counter example, composability and its reverse operation factorizability work just fine even when condition 141 does not. Violating 141 leads in general to loss of positivity in a C* algebra and the loss of the lower bound for energy. This all can be remedied however using Dirac's filled sea levels trick and while this only works for fermions and is replaced in modern field theory by understanding an electron going back in time as a positron going forward in time in a Feynman diagram, we are not in second quantization yet which is a verry different ball game.
It is a most common misconception that the only valid QM are based on reals, complex and quaternions (division algebras). Unrestricted division in QM is useless. Insisting on division on all costs artificially eliminates other valid cases and prevents a structural unification with relativity.
Dear Joy,
Let me start here a new thread so we can simplify the exchange.
I re-read the papers you suggested. I also revisites your FQXi talk. I think that the key sentences are as follows:
1"Such a naive map would therefore necessarily fail to satisfy the completeness criterion of EPR."
2."Every element of the physical reality must
have a counterpart in the physical theory. (EPR)"
3. "in each case we began by noting that a Hilbert space in general is a topological vector space whose topology is given by a norm. Then, by using the normalization condition on its elements we recognized--say, for the two-level system--that the corresponding Hilbert space has the topology of a 3-sphere."
So I do get your points. Fully. But I don't think you get my argument. Let's do a little game and apply your program on a toy example. Let's apply statement 2 on classical mechanics, and let's say on phase space. Then analyze its topology. Here you cannot claim you get local realism because the symplectic space defines only volumes and there are no local invariants possible. Local realism means somerthing more. And let's forget Grangier and address my criticism instead. The disagreement is not on your math results, or on your method, or on your usage of geometric algebra. The disagreement is on the interpretation of your results. Specifically on what you call local realism. The gimbal lock argument shows that in the original example you are indeed justified to call it local realism. But I do not believe this justification works in general. Granted, I did not give you an example from QM, but I feel that something along the same lines can happen there as well. So if demanding that every element of the physical reality must
have a counterpart in the physical theory (agreed) and analysing correctly the topology as you are doing (agreed again), do you *always* get local realism? Here I say no. And the answer depends on what do you mean by local realism. For me local realism is fundamentally tied with spacetime. As spacetime cannot be always linked with state spaces, local realism is doomed by QM in general.
You say: "The dismissal a la Grangier of my work is thus fundamentally invalid, because it surreptitiously brings us back to the flawed first equation of Bell." That is correct on the part of "because it surreptitiously brings us back to the flawed first equation of Bell". So let's not make it so surreptitiously and let's bring it back front and center.
Indeed, the core disagreement comes back to the topological arguments. If realism is tied with spacetime, than you are forced to discuss only the final outcome of experiments, or the topology {-1, +1}. If realism is tied with the notion of a complete theory, than your full topology argument is valid. For the singlet state, because of su(2)~so(3) we are in a degenerate case: the two distinct interpretations are actually compatible.
On the completeness of QM, based on the EPR analasys I agree with Aerts and Einstein, QM is incomplete (here I am too in the minority view). But local realists are wrong, and Bell's theorem is valid in killing their case BECAUSE THEY ALSO SHARE THE SAME TOPOLOGICAL FLAW THAT YOU DISCOVERED. Therefore while killing Bell's faulty assumption, you did not killed its importance and Bell's result remains very relevant.
What I do not find justified in your analasys is the implicit extention of realism definition based on completness of the theory instead of spacetime and the experimental outcomes. To me, EPR's logic was not that impecable, and I can debate this point more if you like.
Granted, you may call completness of the theory realism, but this is not everyone else thinks realism is, or what I think it should be.
Dear Joy, I started a new thread for simplifying the exchange. Please se my answer below. Thanks, FLorin
I am waiting an answer, but apparently it's not possible.Transparence my friend.ahahah 4 spheres classical and 7 and after how many ahahah learn the 3d polarity please hhihii the arrogance and the humility are so humans.
On that regards
SPHERICALLY YOURS
Steve THE THEORY OF SPHERIZATION A GUT TOE OF SPINNING(ROTATING)SPHERES,a beautiful gauge no hihiih QUANTUM SPHERES....COSMOLOGICAL SPHERES....UNIVERSAL SPHERE.
oh yes still one thing EUREKA with humility and arrogance.
ps2 you speak a lot dear friends but where are your real innovations, answer nowhere simply....
Best Regards
Steve
God(creates and improves a sphere, yes my friend) bless you ....sincerelly.
GOD BLESS YOU .
Steve
Dear Florin,
To tie local realism with spacetime is to make a serious category error. We do not know the true nature of spacetime. We do not know what is happening at the Planck scale. We do not even know the correct dimensionality of spacetime. I am not a big fan of string theory, but it has taught us some lessons about the dimensionality of spacetime that cannot be unlearned. At any rate, none of the masters---Einstein, EPR, von Neumann, or Bell---made such a category error. The reality criterion of EPR, for example, is quite minimalist: "If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity." There is no commitment here, of any kind, to spacetime. Bell is even more careful. His locality condition depends only on the idea of factorizability of his beables. Again, no commitment to spacetime. And von Neumann's masterful systematization of the hidden variables program too is extremely minimalist. He recognized that no matter which model of physics one is concerned with--the quantum mechanical model, the hidden variables model, or any other--for theoretical purposes all one needs to consider are the expectation values of the observables measured in various states of the physical system. Thus all of the pioneering masters---Einstein, EPR, von Neumann, and Bell---are very careful to avoid any excessive commitment to a contingent notion like "spacetime." And in my work I follow the works of these masters. But you want to tie local realism to spacetime, and that is surely a grave mistake.
So what I call local realism is not some ad hoc idea. It is what is defined by these masters, and it is what I learned from Shimony and Bell as a young student (yes, I have been very privileged in that respect---and, by the way, Bell was one of the least dogmatic physicists I have ever met). To be sure, there is nothing wrong with having some intuitive ideas about spacetime when we are in our workingman's clothes. But one shouldn't forget the lessons of the masters when the most general idea of local realism is being discussed---for not everything they have said is wrong. Thus my entire program is based on von Neumann's and Bell's systematizations of local realism. This amounts to reproducing every quantum mechanically predicted expectation value in a dispersion-free manner. Since expectation values are independent of the spacetime structure, spacetime does not constrain the von Neumann-Bell program in any way, and yet it is capable of accommodating any notion of spacetime required by the future theory of physics (i.e., the future "quantum gravity").
There is another conceptual flaw in your whole outlook. I think your thinking is derived from your mistaken perception that my framework is somehow a reformulation of quantum mechanics. That this cannot be the case can be seen easily. We know that QM cannot be interpreted as a complete, local, and realistic theory (we know this since EPR). One of the three must be sacrificed in any interpretation, baring many worlds. But my framework is complete, local, and realistic, and since everything is definite in this framework there is not even an option for any many world interpretation. So my framework cannot possibly be a mere reformulation of QM. Now I think some of your views of my work are due to the confusion about this issue that you have inherited from Grangier. This is also related to your comments about my use of division algebras (from your other post today). You are still thinking in terms of reformulating QM using a division or non-division algebra. But I am concerned about local realism, and hence about preserving local causality, and yet reproducing strong, quantum correlations within my local realistic framework (which is derived from the von Neumann-Bell program). And for this, division algebras are not only inevitable, but very natural. One does not need Dixon's book to realize that without parallelizability and a divisor the points of a sphere cannot be closed under multiplication, and without the latter there is no infinite factorizability of every conceivable point of a sphere, and without factorizability there is no local causality (even a single non-local point would kill local causality---that is why so many claims of local-realistic models are invalid). I have discussed this in greater detail in my latest paper. A casual thinking about these issues will not do. A deep reflection on this matter, and a deep appreciation of the well known topological theorems, is essential.
I hope these comments makes it clear why I am doing what I am doing, and why I think you are wrong about some of your assertions. To be sure, I see value in your investigations too, but not within my program.
I discuss with one of your friend The Dr Santuary,apparently he makes a pub for a 2d anyon on linkedin aps.What is this anyon? A CIRCLE hihihh thus you begin with a 1 d after a 2 d and hop an other there ahaahaha interesting.Ironic but interesting.
It could be well if they were here with you.because Han Geurdes is there also.We are going to laugh in live.
well tried.
Sicerelly
Steve
Perhaps, since this whole thing started with Einstein, it is appropriate to see what he says about spacetime. Peter Jackson quotes Einstein as saying in 1952 that:
"The concept of space as something existing objectively and independent of things belongs to pre-scientific thought, but not so the idea of the existence of an infinite number of spaces in motion relative to each other."
Jackson claims:
"We view Cartesian coordinates as a 'frame', and refer to inertial frame, yet Einstein referred to a body, or coordinate system rigidly connected to a body."
Local gravito-magnetic or C-fields take the form of induced circulation 'rigidly connected to a body' with momentum. The connection is the '=' sign connecting the C-field circulation to momentum: del cross C = p.
Momentum also allows us to treat entities that have zero rest mass, such as photons. Two such entities forming 'discrete fields' each centered on matter in relative motion are shown in the figure on page 6 of my essay.
I believe that this is in support of Joy Christian's points on space-time and I believe it supports local realism.
I also wish to convey to Joy and Florin my appreciation for their exchanges. I'm sure I speak for all of us.
Edwin Eugene Klingman
Dear Joy,
I am still digesting your results (I am almost done), but my understanding of your position already benefitted greatly from the past exchanges. For example I see now I was naively tying your approach to Hilbert spaces. Your approach to local realism is much more subtle. As such, my earlier objections about division are void and I withdraw them. I think that the real debate should be around EPR and the meaning of local realism. At core is your mixing of factuals and counterfactuals to get the new topology. I have to think before formulating a for or against position at this time. Hopefuly I will have a position within a few days. I will try to see if I can obtain a meaningful distinction between traditional local realism and "factorizable completness" besides factual-conterfactual.
A few other side remarks. Let me repeat that I was not influenced in any shape or form by Grangier's comments. I did not fully agree with him, but his ideas resonated with mine. Also, QM is incomplete as it cannot account for non-interacting separated systems. I urge you to read Aerts' analasys, it is well worth it.
You say "We know that QM cannot be interpreted as a complete, local, and realistic theory (we know this since EPR)."
I don't know where you have seen that but if it's your line of reasoning, thus I am understanding your confusions.Deatils falses ...thus globality false.
The realism is not there.Copenaghen probably can help you but apparently the rationalism is not loved by all.
PS YOUR ALGEBRAS ARE BAD USED, YOUR INFINITIES AND LIMITS ALSO.....THUS YOUR PROPORTIONALITIES WITH THE NEWTONIAN FRACTALIZATION HAS NO SENSE.Your causalities are not locals and rational simply.The realism is objective and all is relativistically the same.
Sincerely
Steve
Dear Florin,
Thank you for your reply. I am familiar with Aerts's work since my student days (I have a copy of his PhD thesis). But I have not read his more recent work. It sounds consistent with my position. In fact it sounds like a restatement of the so-called "measurement problem." I will read his analysis when time permits.
Dear Edwin,
Thank you for your support. As you can see, Florin and I are making progress in understanding each other's position.
Dear Joy,
I think I figured out what is going on. The EPR completness criterion simply means that one gets the entire state space, be it phase space, Hilbert space, or other spaces. By considering actuals al well as counterfactulas you are then in fact ignoring the time evolution and get the entire state space. In general, any state space will obey EPR's completness criterion. (Try your approach on classical mechanics for a hypothetical hidden variable theory.)
Local realism in your approach is only factorizability. Factorizability is the opposite of entangelment and this gives the approach its classical intuition. Factorizability is not local realism as locality was considered by Einstein and Bell to mean just that: spatial separation. So is Bell's theorem invalid? No, because a Hilbert space dimension is N^2 for N psi(s) and it is not always separable. Still, you manage to arrive at separability. But this is not done directly in the original Hilbert space. For example you need to embed Bloch sphere in S3. S3 becomes then a different kind of state space and in fact you are rewriting QM in a diferent state space with a different formalism. But wait a minute. Is QM not supposed to be uniquely written in Hilbert space formalism? How about Piron's result of recovering Hilbert space over division algebras from propositional logic? The answer is no as there is a counterexample to that: QM in phase space via Moyal bracket.
So your prescription for separability is embedding (if possible) the Hilbert space inside S0, S1, S3, or S7 to achieve parallelizability. Because this contradicts the nonseparability of the standard Hilbert space, this means that QM over S0..S7 is something qualitatively different than a standard Hilbert space formulation. (And indeed, in your formalism you use different mathematical objects.)
Also it is not clear if this formulation of QM goes beyond QM or not. In other words, can you always succeed in embedding any Hilbert space in S0..S7? Probably not based on dimensional analasys for higher dimensions.
Another issue. If Bloch sphere is embedded in S3, would not this mean that we still deal with traditional complex QM? Let's look at another example first. Real quantum mechanics can be embeded in complex QM, but the meaning of the wavefunctions is qualitatively different. Probably something along similar lines is happenning here, I don't know. To get a better grip, an analasys of time evolution might clarify things as time tends to dissapear from the picture as both actuals and counterfactuals are considered. Maybe this analasys will show that you are still in a traditional Hilbert space (the spin factor case), and that the Killing flow is what you traditionally obtain in the original embedded space.
If I were to venture a guess, in S3 the time flow is not the same as in Bloch sphere and the meaning of psi does not stay the same. For if they do stay the same, all possible time evolution in Bloch sphere would be enough to achieve EPR completness which is not the same as S3 is needed.
the fermi diracv statistics and the BEC statistics are bad utilized simply.....If it's frozen that' doesn't turn,, thus no mass!!!...false all that....you confound a graphene in 2d(which is really in 3d furthermore)and a real system of analyzes.
The spin is not explained.....
Sincerely
Steve
Hi,
Parallelizable and where is the cause of mass, aswer ...anywhere.
The spinning spheres, entangled, turning are proportional with mass....it's the volumes which must be parallelizables, the volumes of these entangled spheres.Now if you do not insert a correct finite serie for the ultim universal fractal,never the proportions of the local realism shall be found.
The gravitational stability is implied by these rotating sphericl volumes.The mass increases at all moment of evolution.
A real parallelization must be rational for the real interpretation of our localities and globalities.
Regards
Steve