[deleted]
Dear Joy,
Let me start here a new thread so we can simplify the exchange.
I re-read the papers you suggested. I also revisites your FQXi talk. I think that the key sentences are as follows:
1"Such a naive map would therefore necessarily fail to satisfy the completeness criterion of EPR."
2."Every element of the physical reality must
have a counterpart in the physical theory. (EPR)"
3. "in each case we began by noting that a Hilbert space in general is a topological vector space whose topology is given by a norm. Then, by using the normalization condition on its elements we recognized--say, for the two-level system--that the corresponding Hilbert space has the topology of a 3-sphere."
So I do get your points. Fully. But I don't think you get my argument. Let's do a little game and apply your program on a toy example. Let's apply statement 2 on classical mechanics, and let's say on phase space. Then analyze its topology. Here you cannot claim you get local realism because the symplectic space defines only volumes and there are no local invariants possible. Local realism means somerthing more. And let's forget Grangier and address my criticism instead. The disagreement is not on your math results, or on your method, or on your usage of geometric algebra. The disagreement is on the interpretation of your results. Specifically on what you call local realism. The gimbal lock argument shows that in the original example you are indeed justified to call it local realism. But I do not believe this justification works in general. Granted, I did not give you an example from QM, but I feel that something along the same lines can happen there as well. So if demanding that every element of the physical reality must
have a counterpart in the physical theory (agreed) and analysing correctly the topology as you are doing (agreed again), do you *always* get local realism? Here I say no. And the answer depends on what do you mean by local realism. For me local realism is fundamentally tied with spacetime. As spacetime cannot be always linked with state spaces, local realism is doomed by QM in general.
You say: "The dismissal a la Grangier of my work is thus fundamentally invalid, because it surreptitiously brings us back to the flawed first equation of Bell." That is correct on the part of "because it surreptitiously brings us back to the flawed first equation of Bell". So let's not make it so surreptitiously and let's bring it back front and center.
Indeed, the core disagreement comes back to the topological arguments. If realism is tied with spacetime, than you are forced to discuss only the final outcome of experiments, or the topology {-1, +1}. If realism is tied with the notion of a complete theory, than your full topology argument is valid. For the singlet state, because of su(2)~so(3) we are in a degenerate case: the two distinct interpretations are actually compatible.
On the completeness of QM, based on the EPR analasys I agree with Aerts and Einstein, QM is incomplete (here I am too in the minority view). But local realists are wrong, and Bell's theorem is valid in killing their case BECAUSE THEY ALSO SHARE THE SAME TOPOLOGICAL FLAW THAT YOU DISCOVERED. Therefore while killing Bell's faulty assumption, you did not killed its importance and Bell's result remains very relevant.
What I do not find justified in your analasys is the implicit extention of realism definition based on completness of the theory instead of spacetime and the experimental outcomes. To me, EPR's logic was not that impecable, and I can debate this point more if you like.
Granted, you may call completness of the theory realism, but this is not everyone else thinks realism is, or what I think it should be.