Hello Dean,

I particularly like the last two paragraphs, including the quote, "At the heart of everything is a question, not an answer..."

Thanks

joseph markell

Dean,

You say that the problem with representation is that it isn't clear whether there really *is* anything in the world being represented.

Alfred Korzybski, in 'Science and Sanity' declares that "the map is not the territory" and, in so many words, implies that the ability to distinguish the two is the basis of sanity. Of course he probably included an escape clause for philosophers.

You discuss the Stoics but then say "The system of thought that results is a representation of the hypothesized features of the world." I like this statement and believe that it applies well beyond the Stoics. The "system of thought" is the neural maps in our brain, the connections and re-connections and it is just these internally formed models that are "in-formed" by information.

You then state that digital states "mean something", but this is true only for particular observers. In another thread someone suggested that "Watch out for the bus!" has consequences and so this information should be considered 'real'. But if you only speak Chinese, "Watch out for the bus" means nothing. Yet the energy of the moving bus is real in all cases. Clearly information has reality only with respect to an observer. You seem to be claiming that nothing else has reality. I dare you to stand in front of the bus and argue this point.

Wheeler's statement that "every particle, every field [etc] derives its very existence entirely...from the apparatus-elicited answers...bits." and that "all things physical are information-theoretic in origin and ...this is a participatory universe" is mystical and meta-physical, not physics.

For Wheeler, "Before measurement by an observer, there is no physical reality." [I believe that Zeilinger says the same thing.] I personally hope Joy Christian's position on Bell's inequality is accepted before physics plunges over the cliff. When physics becomes indistinguishable from mystical religions, religious taxpayers will revolt and even "separation of church and state" will enter the picture.

You claim that Eddington's view has much in common with Wheeler: "...from the existence of mathematical law we infer that our minds have access to something akin to themselves that is in or behind our universe." I subscribe to this wholeheartedly, and my previous fqxi essay Fundamental Physics of Consciousness develops this position in a serious way. But I disagree that this is compatible with most of Wheeler's idea, despite his conclusion that "We see, finally, our own puzzled faces looking back at us."

My theory, which includes consciousness as a primordial field, is based upon the existence of physical reality, and of the actual physical interaction of consciousness with reality. It distinguishes between map and territory where Wheeler confuses the two.

Thanks for an excellent treatment of this complex subject.

Edwin Eugene Klingman

    Hi Edwin,

    Some important points raised here, that I expect will occur to others, so I'l spend a bit of time picking them apart.

    When I say " it isn't clear whether there really *is* anything in the world being represented" I mean that it isn't clear that there is a 'counterpart' object in reality (independent from theory and mind and anything like it). We think of watches as giving us a representation of "time out there", but of course it is only "time-relative-to-a-human-chosen-standard". There is no clock in reality that the Casio and Rolex are both measuring. I am saying something similar applies to our scientific theories, and to questions about the digital/analog nature of reality. An analog watch's being successful in various ways does not imply that there is something in the world that exactly shares it's properties. Likewise, even if we ended up with some successful discrete theoretical system to represent the world, we could not infer a matching 'entity in the world' (that could be seen from a God's-Eye view, as they say). "Representation", "Information", "Reality", "Physical" are all very slippery concepts (weasel words, but we don't have better ones): there is no way to evade metaphysics here! Though you charge me with metaphysics, I would say your stance is in fact far more metaphysical since you are saying precisely that we can "go beyond" what the physical theory tells us (namely the results of measurements). Indeed, in any case, part of what I was saying in this paper was that this *is* a highly metaphysical question, not something to be settled by physics.

    The bus example is just a version of Dr Johnson kicking a stone in a bid to refute idealism. I'm defending a form idealism here, but of a very restricted kind. I'm not denying the existence of an 'external world' or anything of that sort. I am denying that there is anything like a Gods-eye view of reality that physical theories can map like cartographers. Rather, like real cartographers, all sorts of approximation schemes must ALWAYS be employed.

    I was careful to define "physical universe" to be the framework that physical theories aim to describe. Of course, both Newton's system and quantum theory are examples of fairly comprehensive physical universes. They are also very much in conflict. Inasmuch as they agree (at certain scales) they agree on the relational structure that is preserved at those scales - not on what they have to say about, e.g., the nature of energy, force, matter, etc... The equations of physical theories do not tell you about what particular objects will do, they tell you about relationships between quantities.

    You might respond: but QM is *better* than Newton's system, since it covers more ground and deals with empirical problems (it maps more terrain)! So it does. But the system that results is nonetheless radically underdetermined. There are lots of ways of interpreting QM, many in direct conflict. But none of them conflict with respect to the relational structure: the answers it gives to our experimental questions (where an experiment will always involve a correlation/coincidence of quantities/objects). Further, there is still massive selection going on in what questions we choose to ask.

    Also: I do not defend Wheeler's position. 'It' does not come from 'bit', it comes from 'us', though it does only in the sense of Eddington's selective subjectivism: it's a highly filtered IT! Eddington has a nice metaphor about just this point. He imagines the scientist to be like a fisherman with a net with quite large holes. The fisherman only ever catches fish over 5cm. Look, he say, ALL fish are over 5cm! Depends on the net of course (where net = theory). We also get the relationship between quantum theory and Newtonian physics from this. If we increase or decrease our net to 5cm holes (change the scales) then we will agree on what there is. Likewise, theories can agree at certain scales, but the scale was a result of selecting particular energies. But there are lots of possible nets, and we never know if we have included them all.

    I do not think my thesis is in the least bit mystical by the way. I was careful to use the phrase "International system", and this could, with sufficient ingenuity, be made by future humans, or could be entirely distinct from humans. If it has radically distinct faculties for sensing and gathering data (or a radically different environment), then you can bet that the theories that result will be of a very different kind to ours, though could be just as successful in their own way. We are surely adapted for pattern finding and unifying things together into classes? Those that didn't act in this way would not do very well in a rapidly changing,

    Lastly: METAPHYSICS IS NOT THE SAME THING AS MYSTICISM!

    What everyone is doing, when they are engaging in the interpretation of physics, is metaphysics. Why? Because physics isn't able to settle these matters. Why not? Because all of the different interpretations make the same predictions (which, I might add, amount to experimental results/ measurements). Why? Because if they didn't they could be ruled out (or in) on grounds of empirical inadequacy.

    Best,

    Dean

    Dean,

    Thanks for the extensive reply. I'm happy with these answers, particularly "I'm not denying the existence of an 'external world' or anything of that sort." Many seem to be doing just this; I'm glad you're not. That takes care of the 'mystical' issue.

    I didn't realize Eddington was author of the 'fishnet' story, but it's one of my favorites.

    And I agree with you about meta-physics. All of today's theories are meta-physical to some extent.

    By clarifying these points you've probably headed off a number of questions (and maybe opened up more?)

    Thanks again for an excellent treatment of this topic, and good luck in the contest.

    Edwin Eugene Klingman

    Dean,

    Thank you for the very insightful essay! I appreciate the philosophical acumen you bring to the topic. I was also struck by the remarkable similarity of your ideas with those in my essay. If you're so included, I'd love to hear your thoughts on it, and any references to your further thoughts along these lines.

    Regards,

    Tom

    P.S.: On the top of p.5 of your essay, there appears to be a typo in the phrase "there is no such thing as a no phenomenon".

      Thanks for the typo. It should read: "there is no such thing as a phenomenon," of course.

      I see there are lots of similarities to your essay: I couldn't agree more with your stance against 'substance' in physics.

      Best,

      Dean

      Sorry, I meant to add. In terms of references, two relevant things I've written are:

      1. "Who's Afraid of Background Independence?" - http://bit.ly/gyltkh

      2. "Time and Structure in Canonical Gravity" - http://bit.ly/ggT4pv (also, plenty of the other papers in this volume are relevant)

      Also, the book: Symmetry, Structure, and Space: http://bit.ly/hCHlap

      You might also like John Earman's papers "Thoroughly Modern McTaggart" - http://bit.ly/g0AFlV and "The Implications of General Covariance for the Ontology and Ideology of Spacetime" http://bit.ly/h3iGZA (especially p. 16 and onwards)

      Also, I think you would like almost anything Eddington has written - you probably know his stuff already. His book on Philosophy of Science is where selective subjectivism receives its clearest exposition.

      I'll read your essay more closely when I get a spare moment. I see one area of disagreement in your phrase "any description of reality by physics is necessarily discrete at its foundations". I think descriptions can be continuous or discrete, but when we try to connect them up to the world we inevitably have to make do with the discrete events that you mention later on - perhaps this is what you mean by (at its foundations?).

      Best,

      Dean

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      • Post #16

      Hello,

      I am disappointed by all essays I read that limit their scope to epistemological issues. I understand this is the prevailing attitude in modern philosophy departments because ontology is accused as being naive realism and reductionism. However, I know of no significant contribution or advancement to science that came out of a philosophy department. If I am in error, please provide a reference.

      This essay contest is not in my opinion of course about philosophy and questions like: what can we know about reality, if anything at all?" It is about the conflict between quantum mechanics and general relativity. General Relativity cannot survive spacetime quantization while QM is gaining points constantly.

      I think the effort in this essay was to undermine the analog vs. digital issue. This is a widespread practice in philosophy departments worldwide in an effort not to upset the status quo, like saying for example, "fine guys, from an epistemological perspective you are both correct, let's continue business as usual". This position does not serve science and humanity very well. Reality does not care about our physical theories and our understanding of them. Is this so hard for modern philosophers to understand this?

      Thank you.

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        • Post #17

        Thanks for your answer. I think, however, that you may be underestimating the digital view. Perhaps because it has been longly underestimated with simplified views such as the It from Bit and the like. But one does not need to align bits with matter but with processes. It is a mistake to equal digital with discrete matter.

        Dear Dean,

        I enjoyed reading your stimulating essay. You distinguish between two ways the analog/digital debate can go: '...(1) as a claim about the discreteness (or not) of space, time, and matter; (2) about the computational nature of the universe.' In my own essay, I pursue the latter course.

        I've taken the liberty to comment on some of your passages, in a manner I hope will be welcome:

        'Often the assumed denseness of an analogical model is parasitic on the assumed dense nature of the process or object functioning as the model.' I would point out that, similarly, often the assumed "sparseness" of a digital model is assumed to reflect some ontological discreteness in nature.

        '...the question "Is reality digital or analogue?" concerns representation,

        and representation involves intentional systems...' The digital strikes me, specifically, as paradigmatically a product of definition. The analog is too--technically speaking (i.e. as a mathematical definition)--though through common experience it is more familiar and so is more readily associated with the natural reality it represents. That is, one thinks of the real mercury in a thermometer as 'analog', since its expansion appears macroscopically to be continuous, whereas the scaled markings are 'digital' and clearly imposed for the sake of "reading" the temperature.

        "...that which we call reality arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes-no questions and the registering of equipment-evoked responses; in short, that all things physical are information-theoretic in origin and that this is a participatory universe." [Wheeler] This may be what Wheeler calls 'reality', on some phenomenological basis, but it cannot be the usual sense implied by physical realism. I would agree that this describes physical knowledge, though not necessarily physical reality. I can sympathize with the sentiment of a participatory universe, though I suspect Wheeler goes somewhere with this I would not dare to. Again, he seems to be talking about "experience" rather than "external reality".

        'For Wheeler, in an important sense, epistemology precedes ontology: bit

        precedes it.' However, 'bit' is a concept historically derived from 'it' (info theory from thermodynamics). Even if we consider it logically independent, it is still a concept derived from general experience in the real world (bit = thing), just as set theory is. The conclusion is recycled as the premise.

        '...there is no such thing as a phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon.' This is an ambiguous use of 'phenomenon'. It should mean EITHER the representation in experience (or in science) OR the thing it represents, but not both. Similarly in the expression '...past events are not definite'. 'Definite' is ambiguous, since it can refer to what is definitely known or what is causally determined. Wheeler should have known better. But your sympathetic conclusion is justified: 'Theories about the physical world inescapably bear our imprint; they are constructed to account for our experience.'

        'All we have to go on in science... is pointer-readings, the record of some interaction, and the relationships between such entities. These take the form of coincidences [events]...' This reminds me of Keith Oatley's description (in 'Perceptions and Representations, 1978) of "flying blind"--the metaphorical position of the brain, sealed inside the skull, obliged to navigate solely by instrument. Also, Maturana and Varela pursued similar ideas ('Autopoeisis and Cognition'), generalized to the case of the organism in relation to its environment. Taking off on these concepts, I once wrote a chapter in a philosophical novelette, to explore the encapsulated brain metaphor through a Cartesian theater analogy. The protagonists somehow find themselves inside the control room of what appears to be a space ship of some sort, but turns out to be an advanced alien machine-based life form(!) They discover for themselves the art of flying blind when they try to figure out how the thing works, simply by trial and error of observing correlations between inputs (control levers) and results on their instrument displays. They then develop a program to account for these correlations, thus creating an automatic pilot and (largely) working themselves out of a job...

        'All physical theories are, in this sense, approximations: they go beyond what

        is observed (namely, discrete events).' I think more can be said than that they are "approximate" in a quantitative sense. There is a qualitative difference between theory and reality, which I like to characterize as the difference between artifact (the 'made') and natural reality (the 'found'). Certainly I agree that expecting too much can get us into trouble. I do think, however, that there is some utility yet to be squeezed out of recognizing this qualitative difference, and not mistaking the map for the territory.

        Thanks for a well-written essay, a pleasure to read!

        Dan

        The scope of this essay contest (discussed here) expressly includes the philosophy of physics as an appropriate viewpoint.

        Nice essay Dean. Incidentally, I know Steven French (actually, we should nominate him for FQXi membership), though I haven't seen him in several years. He was the external examiner on my PhD thesis which dealt with Eddington's Fundamental Theory. Great guy.

          "I know of no significant contribution or advancement to science that came out of a philosophy department" What an incredibly shortsighted comment!

          Though not from philosophy departments themselves, Einstein's analysis of simultaneity in special relativity, of general covariance in general relativity (based on the point-coincidence argument), Boltzmann's analysis of entropy, Bohr's formulation of QM (and many of Schrodinger and Heisenberg's contributions), all resulted from epistemological (conceptual) analyses - in many cases there debts to philosophers, especially Hume and Kant, were directly acknowledged.

          "fine guys, from an epistemological perspective you are both correct, let's continue business as usual" - I don't recall saying anything of the sort.

          "Reality does not care about our physical theories and our understanding of them." -

          Do you want to provide an argument for this assertion? Defining what you mean by `Reality', 'physical theory', 'our understanding of them', and the relationship between them? Then we can talk.

          As Ian rightly says, the scope of the essay competition is much wider than you suppose.

          Hi Ian,

          Re: nomination - good idea!

          I've read your PhD thesis by the way (Steven mentioned it to me ages ago). For those who don't know it, it's well worth a read: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0603146 - I learned a lot of new facts about Eddington from it.

          I liked your essay too - similar conclusion ("our knowledge of the universe is discontinuous"), but very different route to get there (including what might be the first ever Jethro Tull reference in an academic paper!).

          Best,

          Dean

          Dean,

          I couldn't resist the Tull reference. And, wow, you actually read my thesis! I'm humbled. Steven only read it because he had to. :) I was working on turning it into a book for CUP a couple of years ago when my computer HD crashed. I still have the original, but lost all this great work I'd done to "spruce it up." I plan to go back to it soon.

          I see you are slated to be at the FQXi conference in August so we will meet in person. Also, I think you know Ken Wharton as well, correct? I've just nominated him for FQXi membership. I definitely think we should nominate Steven, though, as well. I'll send Kavita an e-mail (don't know if it's too late or not).

          Ian

          Dean,

          Thanks so much for this links to all the interesting references! I will enjoy following up on those. As you suspect, I'm familiar with Eddington, but have not read all his work yet. By the way, Ian has just pointed me to his dissertation on Eddington which I look forward to reading.

          I agree completely with you that "descriptions can be continuous or discrete, but when we try to connect them up to the world we inevitably have to make do with the discrete events."

          Best regards,

          Tom

          Incidentally, I've been mulling over your essay, and it occurred to me that the comments and essays on this site would seem to be strong evidence in and of themselves of your hypothesis.

          Hi Ian,

          You should certainly get the Eddington book ready for publication again - just try to convince yourself that the new revisions will be even better than the last ones (awful to lose hard work and have to do it again)!

          For some reason, I thought Ken was already a member: another good nominee if not.

          Cheers,

          Dean

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          • Post #27

          Bought a 16GB flash drive at Costco for US$35 not long ago, just saw that it's now available online for under US$25 ...

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          • Post #28

          Re: Eddington and philosophy of science. Sometimes people claim that Wittgenstein never said anything about QM. Oh yes, he did.

          "The views of modern physicists (Eddington) tally with mine completely, when they say that the signs in their equations no longer have 'meanings', and that physics cannot attain to such meanings but must stay put at the signs. But they don't see that these signs have meaning in as much as -- and only in as much as -- immediately observable phenomena (such as points of light) do or do not correspond to them.

          "A phenomenon isn't a symptom of something else: it is the reality. A phenomenon isn't a symptom of something else which alone makes the proposition true or false: it itself is what verifies the proposition."

          -- Philosophical Remarks, pp 282-3