• [deleted]

  • Post #12

Joe,

You are violating one of the axioms presented in Robert's essay, "A mathematical symbol and its associated descriptor(s) should contain all the entity's components such there is no confusion as to the meaning." Geometry is a specific type of mathematical abstraction, and when used properly, it can provide a basis for describing physical law characteristics. You are using a geometric plane shape to represent some physical law concept with no supporting evidence except by definition, "a circle denoting abstract energy." You can get away with that slight-of-hand if you are an artist, as an artist does not have represent anything that is actually real. The paint-by-number process is attempting to replicate something that is real.

A physical characteristics of the universe is something entirely different, with a equation attempting to describe it in the abstract language of mathematics, which can use actual numeric values with their descriptors and/or symbols to represent numeric values and their descriptors. If you read the IEEE article cited in my essay, 1294, you will find that I used identical geometric shapes, each with proper dimensional descriptors, to describe two physical law characteristics, space (length) and a time dependent action (frequency). Note that the duration of time did not have to be defined, it became a function of the angle of the triangle. I did not have to know the size of the dimensions ahead of time.

Postprint Methodology

You utilized different geometric shapes to represent different physical law characteristics with no dimensional descriptors. You then concluded that a proper resultant could be achieved just by having all the shapes inside the circle equaling the area of the circle.

This essay contest is the result of the "physics fiction" created by the professionals, where they are using assumptions that everyone is supposed to accept without question. Would an intelligent species continue to use the meter as a scientific unit of measure when it has been demonstrated an "intrinsic length" can be mathematically defined?

Robert's essay exposes the sloppiness of the so-called scientific method as being practiced. I noted in an earlier comment how the symbol c, representing the speed of EM emissions, is supposed to be accepted without specifying whether it is a theoretical value or measured value. There is a difference.

Robert, thanks for your essay. It is important to expose some of the much publicized weirdness and confusion. It emphasized to me the importance of keeping context in our pursuit of understanding. Context can be thought of as the set of initial conditions lost when we use relationships to distill observations. From an information theory standpoint, context is the denominator in a probability that makes the probability meaningful. It is a large pertinent denominator that makes one observation interesting (not devoid of information...I like your definition). In my essay "A top-down approach to fundamental forces", I use a count of the total number of particles (WMAP) as a denominator in probabilities that I believe nature uses to present its information. Once the pertinent denominator is determined, it is maintained throughout the analysis since this allows extraction of meaningful information. Information can be operated on to create subsets that represent different things to us. For example in my work, I show that the logarithm 90 is divided into four parts we call dimensions and the result 22.5 represents the Higgs particle. Meaning is not lost since after the division by 4 we can say "In a universe that has exp(180) particles and four dimensions, one particle is the Higgs particle". If we just discover the Higgs particle we don't understand its context.

  • [deleted]

  • Post #14

Dear Mr. Makinson,

Do forgive me for violating whatever it was I violated. I misunderstood your assessment that abstract mathematical equations can be compared to the production of a real paint by numbers picture. Now you assert that abstract mathematical equations can only be considered to be accurate providing they incorporate numbers that have real numeric values. That seems reasonable. The number 1 must have a real numeric value of 1. What is the real numeric value of 11? Do the first and second number 1s in the eleven have the same real numeric value as the first number 1 I typed? See, real things do not have a real numeric value, but they do constantly change. Is the number 11, eleven real numeric times the real numeric value of first 1? What is the real numeric value of the real space between the two 1's? Can the real numeric value of the space around the two ones equal the real numeric value of the space between the two ones? Does the real numeric value of space increase or decrease with its extensiveness? Does the real numeric value of the 1 depend on the size of its representation? I think it ought to. I think that there should be an official standard for number representation as there is for the measurement of the speed of light. Otherwise, it gets kind of Orwellian with tall 1's really equaling short 1's, and real big chasms equaling real narrow gaps.

Rather than reading your IEEE tract 1294 where you claim to use "identical geometric shapes" to prove something or other about reality, why do you not read my essay, Sequence Consequence where I prove conclusively to the complete satisfaction of anybody with a scrap of common sense that real identical states have never existed and real identical states will never exist. I am not saying that scientifically propounded abstract theorems which all use imaginary identical numbers and identical shapes and identical imaginary observation are wrong. I am saying they are all unrealistic. As I understood this essay contest, authors were asked to comment on "questioning the foundations, "and that is what I tried my best to do.

Hi Robert H. McEachern,

The essays in this contest have shown me that not everyone has TV commerical logic instilled in their brains. Your essay is brilliant and shows thinking that has been long thought through. Congradulations.

Jim Akerlund

Hello, Robert

It seems we are on a parallel track. Your analysis of quantum weirdness as an artifact of mathematical treatment is very interesting. I don't feel qualified to comment, but I do have a question: wouldn't "two entangled (anti-parallel) coins" be "spooky"?

Thanks for your wonderful essay.

Dan

    • [deleted]

    • Post #17

    Dan,

    Unfortunately Robert doesn't seem to be participating in the conversation.

    There are various entries in this contest which do a very credible job of addressing the topic of questionable assumptions built into theoretical physics, yours included. Given the rather conservative judging of previous contests, it seems reasonable to think the winner of this will be one which doesn't raise serious issues for the status quo. I'm thinking those of us who do think a serious review is necessary should select one entry to give a ten, then eights and nines for our other favorites. I feel Robert's entry would be the best candidate. Besides its many strengths for those us who have followed the topic for years, I think it would be most accessible and informative to the young technogeeks thinking of a career in theoretical physics. We don't need another generation chasing string theory and multiworlds.

    What do you think?

    Why "spooky"? Suppose we had two real coins, like pennies, and I told you, so that you have a priori knowledge, that I have positioned them such that no matter how you look at one, the other will be in the opposite state (imagine them floating, motionless, in space). Then, at some latter time, I inform you that one is in the state "heads", when viewed from a particular aspect angle. Nothing spooky happens when you then view the other coin from the same aspect angle, and see that it is "tails". You knew, a priori, that that was bound to happen - I told you so previously. The real issue is that in the standard misinterpretation of quantum mechanics, the "state of the object's attribute", it's "heads" versus "tail-ness", is not supposed to be in any definite state until it is observed. But the "state" of an object like a coin is not an attribute of the coin at all. Rather, it is an attribute of the relationship between the coin and the observer. When you finally observe a two-sided coin, it does not suddenly "collapse" into a one-sided coin. Only the relationship between the coin and the observer has "collapsed" into a definite state, either "heads" or "tails".

    Hi, Robert

    OK, the state of a given coin is relative to the observer's position. But is the relationship between the two coins themselves also an artifact of the observer? By specifying that at the outset you have made it a matter of definition, but is it so in nature? A physical explanation of entangled correlations might be, for example, that they are two localities on a common wave front. How might that sort of explanation relate to the coin analogy, I wonder?

    thanks,

    Dan

    Hi, John

    I agree with you about the merit of Robert's contribution, though I don't follow all his arguments and confess I haven't read many of the submissions. Last year I simply abstained from "voting", and will probably do the same this year.

    cheers,

    Dan

    The relationship between the two coins is not an artifact of the observer. It is an artifact of the "creator" of the relationship; that is, the person who first positioned the coins in that relationship, or the experimental apparatus that entangled two objects.

    I did indeed make it "a matter of definition" for the real, macroscopic coins. But I did not define it that way "in nature". But somebody else did. That is the point. That, and nothing else, is what the word "entangled" means, in this context. The "creator" knows, a priori, that this type of relationship exists, because he/she/it deliberately created the pair that way.

    However, there is a subtlety that you might have missed regarding the nature of this relationship. Even the creator does not know what state (heads or tails) would be observed, if an observation of one of the coins was attempted. He only knows that whatever state is eventually observed, an observation of the other entangled object must produce the opposite state.

    The situation is somewhat analogous to saying the creator created a pair of gloves. Then, when a later observer spots one of the gloves, and realizes that if is a "right hand" glove, he then can infer, from the a priori definition of what is meant by "a pair of gloves", and without ever having seen it, that the other glove must be a "left hand" glove.

    The absolutely critical difference between the pair of gloves and the pair of coins is this; the right hand glove is a right hand glove, from the moment it was first created. It is in a definite state, because "handedness" is a real attribute of gloves. But a coin is neither heads nor tails when it is first created. It is both simultaneously, because it has two sides. Unlike a glove, only an observation of a coin can put "it" into a definite state of being either "heads" or "tails". But "it" does not refer to the coin, unlike the case with the glove, "it" refers to the state of the relationship between the coin and the observer.

    Bell failed to consider this distinction in his proof. That is where all the "weirdness" originates.

    Hi Robert, Dan,

    I've noted elsewhere that d'Espagnat claims the world is based on reality, inductive reasoning, and locality, and that most Bell'ists have decided to give up reality and locality and retain 'logic'. Some current essays suggest banishing space-time, unitarity, and causality but still assuming that logic and math are available when every thing else is 'as close as possible to "nothing". Having developed a theory of logic and math as emergent from structure, I question whether one can assume that these are still available when all structure has vanished.

    I am also increasingly inclined toward the view that local realism is to be preserved [see my essay, The Nature of the Wave Function ] even at the cost of 'universal logic'. Arguments for this have been presented on my essay thread. But a key aspect of this is, I believe, associated with Robert H McEachern's point about "the state of the relationship between the coin and the observer". In other words, if logic is going to fail, it will probably do so when the necessity for 'self-referential' logic is encountered, as may be the case for Bell's theorem.

    Edwin Eugene Klingman

    Bernard d'Espagnat also claimed one other thing, about what Bell's theorem is based on. Since Scientific American is one of the co-sponsors of this essay contest, allow me to quote from "The Quantum Theory and Reality", by Bernard d'Espagnat, Nov., 1979, p. 166:

    "These conclusions require a subtle but important extension of the meaning assigned to a notation such as Aplus. Whereas previously Aplus was merely one possible outcome of a measurement made on a particle, it is converted by this argument into an attribute of the particle itself. To be explicit, if some unmeasured proton has the property that a measurement along the axis A would give the definite result Aplus, then that proton is said to have the property Aplus. In other words, the physicist has been led to the conclusion that both protons in each pair have definite spin components at all times."

    The problem is, that as the coin example illustrates, this "extension" and "conclusion" are not even true in a classical, macroscopic case. Consequently, there is no logical reason to assume they would be valid in the quantum case.

    • [deleted]

    • Post #24

    Robert,

    just want to say I really like your description of the coins here. Aug. 20, 2012 @ 21:55 GMT.

    Food for thought:

    I was hoping someone would pick up on this, and generate some interesting discussion about

    "What, exactly is the significance of the Uncertainty Principle?"

    If you look at the relations given for the Uncertainty Principle and Shannon's Capacity, for the single particle case mentioned, in which S/N =1, then the uncertainty principle boils down to the statement that "1 = maximum number of bits of information that can be extracted from an observation, in the worst case."

    Duh

    So what is the big deal? What makes this so significant?

      • [deleted]

      • Post #26

      Robert, All,

      isn't it the whole uncertainty idea that an observable isn't something definite until it is measured, and the measurement is what makes it something rather than a superposition of possibilities (as the where and when and what to sample has not yet been decided.) I'm starting to feel really comfortable with the idea now, whereas I used to find that strange. Having realised that it is also the case for macroscopic objects.

      All of the ways in which an object might be observed must exist simultaneously as potential sensory data in the environment, as the observer can choose to regard the object from any distance away, from any orientation and at a time of choice. It is the selection of the data at a particular position and time that determines the manifestation that will be observed. That manifestation will be regarded by the observer as what the object is, not the other possibilities that were not selected. Though it is in truth all of them. The object being the "parent" of all of the possible manifestations of it, generated from interception and processing of EM data.

      Everyone might find this recent experimental result interesting, if you haven't seen it already:

      http://arstechnica.com/science/2012/05/disentangling-the-wave-particle-duality-in-the-double-slit-experiment/

      Dan

      • [deleted]

      • Post #28

      Georgina,

      The "idea" is something like that. And that is the problem. That idea is a misinterpretation of what is happening.

      The point of my previous post, is that the uncertainty principle amounts to no more than the statement that the minimum amount of information that can be extracted from an observation, and still be an observation, is exactly one bit. In other words, it amounts to nothing more than a very curious way of stating the definition of a "bit of information". Consequently, the uncertainty principle says nothing at all about the real world; Nothing about particles, nothing about waves, nothing about physics. It is merely a truism; It is true, by definition.

      Recall the distinction made above between the entangled gloves and the entangled coins. One involves an observation of an actual attribute of the object. The other does not. The two quantities, position and momentum, in the uncertainty relation, are not actual attributes of any object. Like the coin example, they are attributes of the relation between the observer and the object. Consequently, these types of observations are not about the object, and they can therefore not say anything about the object.

      In the case of obtaining only a single bit of information about the actual object, this single bit signifies the answer to the question "Was an entity observed to exist, that is, detected, by the detector?" Yes or No - a single bit answer.

      Thus, for example, when a particle is detected after passing through a double slit apparatus, as a spot on a screen behind the slits. Then you have observed exactly one bit of information about the particle -it exists -it has been detected. The location of the spot on the screen conveys no information about the particle. It only conveys information about the relationship between the particle and the observer.

      Physicists have consistently confused these two very different things. That is the cause of all the "weirdness" in their misinterpretations of reality.

      • [deleted]

      • Post #29

      Anonymous,

      "In the case of obtaining only a single bit of information about the actual object, this single bit signifies the answer to the question "Was an entity observed to exist, that is, detected, by the detector?" Yes or No - a single bit answer.

      Thus, for example, when a particle is detected after passing through a double slit apparatus, as a spot on a screen behind the slits. Then you have observed exactly one bit of information about the particle -it exists -it has been detected. The location of the spot on the screen conveys no information about the particle. It only conveys information about the relationship between the particle and the observer.

      Physicists have consistently confused these two very different things. That is the cause of all the "weirdness" in their misinterpretations of reality."

      You think that the information conveyed by observing existence of anything at anytime is one bit of information???

      James

      The "Anonymous" post a few minutes ago was from me. For some reason, the system logged me out just before the post.

      James,

      You asked:

      You think that the information conveyed by observing existence of anything at anytime is one bit of information???

      Yes. That is the definition of what is meant by a "bit of information", in Information Theory.

      If you ever learn anything else, other than the mere existence of the object, then that represents additional bits of information.

        • [deleted]

        • Post #31

        Dear Robert H McEachern,

        Thank you. I understand your point.

        James