Dear Lloyd,
Thanks for your comment. My statement about math is not as opposed as it seems, to the usual sense there is a parallel or isomorphism between math and the world. Math does only directly tell us about itself. Yet of course if a math structure (per Tegmark) corresponds to an ostensible "real world", the math models that world and tells us what will happen etc. What I mean is, two things. First, math can't tell us why there is (if there is) a concrete "real world" instead of MUH (there IS nothing but math structures), and second: why it would be the way it is. It cannot do the former because it has no resources to represent or explain special existential status beyond itself. It cannot do the second thing, because there are all kinds of math structures, and no way to privilege them in an existentially special way (that follows from the first. Hence, as Tegmark notes, we can't e.g. say there is a reason why octahedrons should be also correspond to "real things", but icosahedrons would not (an analogy to comparing model worlds.)
Furthermore, I don't think a math model can even fully model a world anyway, in the sense of being a complete parallel. In other writings, I bring up issues like quantum randomness (not actually resolved by decoherence/MWI or Bohmian mechanics) and conscious experience. However, math is useful as a very close match, but like "symmetry" in our universe (our universe is not quite fully symmetrical in its laws), it is a near-miss. That may be frustrating or annoying to those who think it should be a complete fit, but what I think the world of experience has already showed us: such is life.
I'll look at your essay in turn, now that I have more time opening up.