I really enjoyed this essay. The insight into the importance of infinite precision to classical physics is a really valuable one and I'm very interested in your work on an indeterministic formulation of classical physics.
I did have some questions about the overall motivation for this work. As I understand it, your argument is that real numbers cannot be physically meaningful because they contain an infinite amount of information. This is supposed to be a problem because it would violate the Bekinstein bound; but the Bekinstein bound comes from GR and/or quantum physics, so is there any reason to think it should hold in classical physics?
Alternatively, it supposed to be a problem because 'physical systems have finite size' and this implies a limit on density of information - but do physical systems have finite size in classical physics? Perhaps there is a coherent interpretation of classical physics where the world is constituted of pointlike particles?
These questions are linked to a larger questions about what an 'interpretation' of classical physics is supposed to do. When we try to `interpret' quantum mechanics, I take it that we are making hypotheses about what the actual reality underlying quantum mechanics might be like. But we don't need to do this in the case of classical mechanics, since the reality underlying classical mechanics is understood to be quantum mechanics. So when we ask whether classical mechanics is deterministic, we're not asking about whether reality is deterministic, rather I guess we're asking whether the view that classical physics is deterministic was a coherent one - but in that case it seems unfair to make an argument based on facts that are not inherent in classical physics? Does it make sense to try to 'interpret' classical physics from the point of view of a modern physicist?