Essay Abstract

We take our world to be an objective reality, but is it? The assumption that the physical world exists in and of itself has struggled to assimilate the findings of modern physics for some time now. For example, an objective space and time would just "be", but by relativity, our space can contract and our time can dilate. Likewise objective "things" should just inherently exist, but the entities of quantum theory are probability of existence smears, that spread, tunnel, superpose and entangle. Cosmology even tells us that our entire physical universe just "popped up", from nowhere, about 14 billion years ago. This is not how an objectively real world should behave! Yet the usual alternatives don't work much better. That the world is just an illusion of the mind doesn't explain its consistent realism and Descartes dualism, that another reality beyond the physical exists, just doubles the existential problem. It is time to consider an option we might normally dismiss out of hand. This essay explores the virtual reality conjecture, that the physical world arises from non-physical quantum processing. It finds it neither illogical, nor unscientific, nor incompatible with current physics. Its implications include that the world is digital at its core.

Author Bio

Brian Whitworth is a Senior Lecturer at the Institute of Information and Mathematical Sciences. Massey University, Albany, Auckland, New Zealand. With a B.Sc. (Mathematics), B.A. (Psychology), M.A. (Neuro-psychology) and Ph.D. in Information Systems, he has published in journals like Small Group Research, Group Decision & Negotiation, The Database for Advances in IS, Communications of the AIS, IEEE Computer, Behaviour and Information Technology (BIT), Communications of the ACM, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, and the online journal First Monday. With Aldo de Moor he edited the Handbook of Research on Socio-Technical Design and Social Networking Systems (2009). See http://brianwhitworth.com/papers.html

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Dear Brian Whitworth,

A truly masterful essay and overview of physics and philosophy. There are so many things that I find quotable, that I would simply reproduce your paper if I yielded to the temptation to quote you approvingly.

Nevertheless, some of your points are better than others, and I will address your weakest points. But before beginning, I want to thank you again for writing your excellent essay. I believe that you actually follow through on logical implications of some of the current interpretations of physics, taking things farther than others have done. Although I think you are wrong, I find your arguments original and well stated and I am glad to see these issues rise to the forefront of physics. For this reason I hope you win high placement, in spite of believing you are mistaken. I think you're dealing with major issues that need to be worked through.

Since, I believe, the foundation of your arguments is your interpretation of entanglement, I will begin there. I hope you enjoy all of my sincere compliments above, because my following comments will be far more critical.

Edwin Eugene Klingman

Dear Brian,

We start from opposite axioms: I claim that we cannot go outside of the physical universe for physics--all else is equivalent to an appeal to God (which is legitimate, but not physics). By contradicting this "prime axiom", that "There is nothing outside the physical universe", the floodgates are open to let anything convenient through, no matter how unlikely or even absurd. You deny objective reality. What is surprising is what a convincing argument you make. But I believe a number of your arguments are either wrong or misleading.

You begin, as many do, by denying local realism. That is the current trend, probably because it's 'sexy'. But one of the world's foremost experts, Anton Zeilinger, has written a book, Dance of the Photons, in which his key arguments are spelled out in appendix A, where he substitutes, for quantum "properties" human properties, such as eye color, hair color, and height. He then proceeds to derive Bell's inequality and to claim that actual measurement results imply that the properties "do not exist until measured".

Now changing the 'name' of the properties has absolutely no effect upon the logic of Bell's inequality, so either his logic is correct or it is not.

And here is the catch. The entire logic is based upon the assumption that the properties do not change en route to being measured! If this assumption is wrong, then the logic of Bell's inequality is wrong, and the drastic step of denying local realism is simply not justified.

That is, when he begins with a "known" set of properties, and derives, based upon this set, Bell's inequality, and finds that measurements violate this inequality, then he concludes that the properties do not exist until the measurement is made.

In Zeilinger's "user friendly" example, all that is necessary to refute this logic is to assert that one or more of the properties changed en route to the measurement. For example, one 'particle' dyes his hair, en route, thereby changing the measurement and violating Bell's inequality.

Now the true believers will object, no, no, no -- you cannot equate 'hair color' with quantum properties, but they are wrong. Bell's inequality does not depend on specific properties. All that is necessary to refute the argument is that properties change en route between the source and the detection.

And as long as *both* entangled particles are treated exactly the same en route, the inequality is not violated, and there is no reason to question local realism. And this is what we find. Only when the pair are interfered with in different ways en route is the inequality violated.

Therefore, one has to ask whether properties can change en route subject to differing physical interactions. And the answer is not available, because there is no rigorous analysis of photons, say in polarizing beam splitters. There is not even agreement on the (basically undefined) 'cut' or 'schnitt' that divides the quantum system being measured from the classical measuring 'apparatus'.

So the answer does not exist -- at this point only 'user preference' is involved. Some physicists, for reasons that I won't speculate on, are willing to give up local realism based on flimsy assumptions. I find that rather drastic, to put it mildly.

I'll try to keep my future comments down, but since this seems to be the basis of all your arguments, and I don't think any other essay yet depends entirely on rejecting local realism, I thought this would be the place to try to nail down this issue.

Edwin Eugene Klingman

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    • Post #4

    Dear Ed

    Thanks for your kind and thoughtful comments. You are right, it is just a conjecture, a question not an answer, but one that I do feel needs airing. When I started this I also thought it would soon fall apart, so am also surprised it still hangs together. Maybe someone here will change that!

    Re that "the floodgates are open to let anything convenient through" - it isnt so, as long as we stay scientific - logic, data, make predictions, falsifiability, etc. It is a theory of this world, not an imaginary metaphysical world made up. The basic idea is just that the physical world is a processing output, with reverse engineering it the "grounded theory" method of science applied to physics. It doesnt advocate (or deny) new age or religious ideas, i.e. you can still believe what you want to believe. Some may use these ideas to justify their pet theories - but thats life isnt it? If it is a world of choice, then let them!

    Your Bell experiment logic is interesting. If the properties of a photon can change en route, without physical interaction, or just before it is observed, isn't the objective reality hypothesis conceded? That a physical photon "thing" can change its properties for no physical reason, is indeed a floodgate. So I think I support Zeilinger. This model just says what others say, including Copenhagen, that in science we are allowed to assume beyond the physical, e.g. quantum fields or your idea of a universal field. This model then just goes all the way, and lets quantum field assumptions be real, i.e. not just mathematical fictions!

    By D'Espagnat, the Bell experiment logic assumes physical realism, Einstein locality and logical induction. By the experimental results, one of these three must be wrong. The VR conjecture moves the word "physical" from the realism to the locality definition. So realism is that there is a (deleted the word physical here!) reality whose existence is independent of human observers and locality becomes that no physical influence of any kind can propagate faster than the speed of light (added the word physical). It drops universal locality but keeps physical locality, i.e. limits Einsteins logic to physical objects. It drops physical realism but keeps realism, i.e. permits a non-physical quantum reality. The reason to give up "localism" is not flimsy, but the results of Bell's experiment.

    The localism assumption targeted is specifically that two photons locally separated in space are necessarily two "things". In this model, photons entangle when photon entity programs generating spreading instantiations co-process to ensure a constant spin zero. The two photons are like two pixels on a screen whose programs are co-processing to keep one black ifthe other is white. See chapter 3, p 29 for details, and for the beam splitter expt details, see p27. Please note, these ideas are very much still in development, so your comments are very helpful.

    kind regards

    Brian Whitworth

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    • Post #5

    Brian,

    Very enjoyable essay. Extraordinarily interesting as expected.

    Best regards,

    Sincerely,

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    • Post #6

    Brian,

    Your didactic is impeccable. I especially appreciate fig. 2. Although I belong to Wheeler's camp, 2a (though I would use the term metaphysical realism vice physicalism) I find much more to agree with than to disagree. Thanks for a delightful read.

    Tom

    Brian, I am happy that you approach this as exploring a conjecture (as opposed to defending a religious belief) and I will be happy to explore it with you, as I see it as a very important conjecture.

    I generally agree with your response to my 'floodgates' remark. What I meant by this is that one would seem to need 'math', so one goes and gets math. If one then needs something else, one goes and gets something else, all outside the universe. In my scheme (which I don't wish to expand here) math follows from the evolution of a self-interacting field that evolves our real universe. If I see any problems, I'll point them out, otherwise ignore my 'floodgates' remark.

    The crucial issue is your next point: "If the properties of a photon can change en route, without physical intervention... isn't the objective reality hypothesis conceded?"

    But I am not proposing "without physical intervention". In that case there is no violation of Bell's inequality. It is only violated when the photons are treated differently by polarizers or beam splitters, and I consider this "physical intervention". If the choice is to give up local realism or to believe that a beam splitter has a physical effect on a photon, the choice is easy.

    For example, if the gravito-magnetic (C-) field described in my essay accompanies every 'object' with momentum (see fig on page 6), then there is definitely a 'mass-sensitive' (see my equation 7) field involved passing through the polarizing beam splitter. Although gravito-magnetism was conjectured by Maxwell, studied by others, and implied by 'weak field' general relativity, I believe recent experiments (discussed in my other comments) lend credibility to this as a 'real' field, whereas, after 80 years, we still don't know what a 'quantum field' is.

    Since you are "letting the quantum fields be real, not just mathematical fictions" I suggest you give serious consideration to the C-field. At least say why it is less reasonable than a quantum field.

    Thanks for the clarification that "the VR conjecture moves the word "physical" from the realism to the locality definitions." I had not quite thought this through, and will spend some time trying to absorb it.

    Finally, you mention chap 3 , p 29 -- is that D'Espagnat, or your book, or what?

    Edwin Eugene Klingman

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    • Post #8

    Brian, I too enjoyed your essay and appreciated Figure 2. Would you care to elaborate a bit on the differences between cases 2b and 2d? They seem similar, although 2d has two observers (or perhaps that's a single reflexive observer).

    In my essay, I suggest that the fundamental observer of the universe is the entire techno-biological superorganism. Any individual sub-observer would experience the world as "internally real," as you put it, which includes the ability to observe itself. However, in that context, 2b and 2d seem to be identical cases. Can you shed any light on why case 2b would not be internally real to the observer?

      Brian, my last comment addressed your "change enroute without physical intervention."

      Entanglement experiments imply that local realism is false because they violate Bell's inequality based on D'Espagnat's 3 assumptions: local realism, Einstein locality, and logical induction, as you pointed out. But if properties change en route (due to interaction with the apparatus) then violation of Bell's inequality does not imply that properties don't exist until measured.

      And if properties do exist, then all relevant properties are expected to conserve momentum and energy. (As you say: "ensure a constant spin zero" or "Keep one black if the other is white.") But then there is no necessary 'non-localism' since the existence of conserved properties means that if one is known, then the other is known. There's no need for 'spooky' communications between Bob and Alice's locations.

      Why is this not obvious? Because the Copenhagen 'superposition of states' inherently does away with realism in favor of mysticism, claiming that quantum objects are 'ghostly' until measured. More than anything else, this probably derives from the two-slit experiments, but the same C-field 'pilot wave' that I claim interacts with beam splitters, etc, would also interact with two slit apparatus, potentially explaining interference observed by experiment.

      As to your point 8: "Superposition. Objective entities cannot spin in two directions at once as quantum entities do...". The physical fact is that a magnetic field can only measure along one axis at once, and this has been distorted by probabilistic representation into spinning in two directions at once.

      There seems to be inconsistency here. On the one hand, "properties cannot change en route without physical intervention" while on the other hand, "properties are in a 'state of superposition' described only statistically by a probability wave function. If only probability applies, why can't things change? One assumes that they are changing until the superposed wave function is measured, 'collapsing' the wave function (ie, the in-transit object) into a real, albeit unpredictable state.

      The necessity for probability implies an essential randomness. You discuss randomness in your point 6, to which I'll return later, but if things can't change, then they are predictable, and if they are only statistically predictable, who's to say they can't change?

      (This is a logical discussion. I contend they do change upon contact with the apparatus.)

      Edwin Eugene Klingman

        Brian

        Thanks for a superbly written essay. I wish my writing skills matched yours, which demonstrate how any hypothesis can be well argued. But I'd like to take up your challenge in support of Local Reality and Edwin's view. First you'd need to read my own essay - and discussions in Edwins thread.

        I start from experimental science. Scattering means photons are not* conserved, i.e the signal is modulated and or polarised. This may be by detector, beam splitter, barbers shop, or the lightest of plasma or gas particle densities. *Chance means some will survive intact. This process itself allows a topographical 'ether' by which those may still communicate.

        All reality is subjective. This is inductive logic. Every* point on a Schrodinger sphere carries a different signal. You causality 'grid engine' keeping photons in order collapses instantly with Einstein Lensing. The discrete field model of reality (DFM) predicted lensing light delays way over the few days expected. We've recently found over 3 YEARS delay! To clarify; photon 2, emitted later, arrived here over 3 years before photon 1.

        http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/cosmicvariance/2009/07/13/guest-post- evalyn- gates-on-cosmic-magnification-or-invasion-of-the-giant-blue-space-amoebas/ MACS J1149.5-2223

        I also show how Relativity has simply been poorly understood and use a quantum mechanism to logically complete it (only ever road blocked by Bells iniquity!).

        I'll follow with an 'off the cuff' response to your other points. I hope you enjoy the determinedly 'feet on the ground' stance of my own essay, though it is based on a reality only ever subjective!

        Peter

          Brian, Your points - off the top of my head!

          1. VR can only work with pre-ordained hard and software (I prefer a wave form expansion & contraction anyway).

          2. 'C'. Objective and local realities MUST have limits or they are neither local or real. I also show how our personal subjective realities must also have the same limit. (It's so real and simple you'll kick a rock).

          3. Planck Limits. Same point as above, although I show how the condensate, 'medium' not counting as mass, may indeed have structure below the plank limit.

          4. Non-Locality. Just a misunderstanding. And the definition of 'impossible' is that it hasn't been done yet. It's being done 1,000 times a day. Reality has no issue with that when a real 'field' link is possible.

          5. Malleable Space Time. Pure conjecture. I show how mass and motion alters space and time in both objective and subjective realities. This simplest of videos may help;http://fqxi.org/data/forum-attachments/1_YouTube__Dilation.htm

          6. Randomness. We judge by our own standards. We have not yet started to conceive how big and complex our real causal world is. ("1,000th of 1%")

          7. Empty Space. I've just re filled it and shown how simply it can work.

          8. Superposition. 'Spin' is NOT 'spinning' as we know it. Our understanding is poor but better than that! The waves in a 'bundle' are almost countless. Huygens knew that in the 1600's! Even the surface of the sea can contain dozens at a time, also 'polarised' differently. We've recently managed to produce 'twin spin' ourselves in the Lab (a recent NS).

          9. Equivalence. Not only are electrons not all identical but each may change within bounds quite regularly. The very variety of particles and 'random' behaviour will prove beyond VR.

          10. Tunnelling. Again that word impossible!, joined by another human misconception 'impenetrable'. We well know all matter is made of particles with void between. Some denser than others, all the particles made of oscillating 'spin' energy. It would be equally 'impossible' for any medium to have enough

          variety of particle spin to catch every single frequency/polarisation mode trying to pas through it. There will always be a resonant frequency.

          A bit like the millions of tadpoles being eaten by ducks. If a few didn't get away there would be no real frogs. And if they croak like frogs they are real.

          I propose the universe is real, and simpler than we thought because our conceptual pattern matching skills are as yet undeveloped. Most will not understand the fundamental implications in my essay. I hope you do, If only as I need to recruit allies!

          Let me know if there are any points I've missed, or ask any questions.

          Best wishes

          Peter

          Brian,

          I have re-read your essay and each time admire it more. (I have given you a high score, but haven't seen it show up.) Although my name is mentioned in another comment above, I don't wish to associate my name with any comments other than my own. I hope to argue a number of points with you in the following weeks, but the problem of local realism is key to everything, so I'd like to nail it down before moving on to other topics. Thanks again for a delightful essay that pushes non-local reality to its, perhaps, logical limits.

          Edwin Eugene Klingman

          Brian,

          I can`t save a copy of your article. I can save a "copy"

          but can't open it and Adobe giving back the message saying it is damaged.. How can I do it or what am I doing wrong?

          thanks,

          Marcel,

          Hi Karl,

          Let me try.

          In physicalism (2a) the world is as it seems - solid, real and self-existent - and consciousness "emerges" from physicality at the information complexity of the human brain, so machines will soon become conscious and replace us. Yet today's computers are socially dumb [1], as their architecture doesn't support the self-awareness to conceive an "I" [2]. And piling up video boards in a supercomputer is like piling up rocks, you get a bigger heap but it is still a rock (machine). So physicalism is dominant but has its problems.

          Enter solipsism (2b), where an observer "dreams" an unreal physical world. It argues that everything is mediated by my mind so is created by it, e.g. Harunyahya's "The secret beyond matter" http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X04jN_xcLis If so, as you say, it will look real, as a dream does, at the time, but with no real external world out there, what makes it consistent? If no-one watches a forest, no tree can fall in it, but what if later one looks to find a tree fell - was a consistent past history also made up? Did we also fabricate the dinosaurs, or the billions of years of universe history? So that's a problem.

          In extreme solipsism everything is created by my mind, so "you" don't exist, i.e. the theory doesn't generalize well! A weaker version is that consciousness creates the world by triggering wave function collapse, as in Schrödinger's cat and your star example. Yet if we are "observation central", how did the universe manage before we came along to collapse its spreading quantum waves by observing them? So that's another problem.

          In contrast, in 2d, we are nothing special, as observer and observed are equal. The physical world arises from quantum interactions that are symmetric, i.e. if you "observe" a photon, it also "observes" you. If quantum collapse follows any quantum interaction, quantum uncertainty doesn't cumulate. It stops if the detector "sees" the photon, whether Schrödinger knows it or not. While in 2b, a conscious observer creates quantum collapse, in 2d the interaction of any "observers" does it. So that is one difference.

          In a virtual reality, observations create the physical world, as quantum theory says, as if one looks left a left view is created and if one looks right another is shown. That observing a virtual reality creates (a view of) it cracks the quantum measurement problem. But in 2d, unlike 2b, there is still a real world "out there" (it just isn't the world we see), i.e. it generalizes ok. That is another difference.

          Virtualism (2d) is the logical reverse of physicalism (2a). As physicalism postulates a physical substrate from whose interactions the conscious observer emerges, so virtualism postulates an observer substrate from whose interactions the physical world emerges. The "observer" in 2d is not us personally as human beings, but all existence "knowing" itself directly. So no tree falls in a forest unseen as the ground it hits "sees" it. There are no "gaps" here and no view history to recapitulate, as quantum reality has been simulating itself to itself from the beginning, i.e. the fundamental observer of the universe is not physical at all, let alone technical or biological, but the essence of consciousness in all things.

          To sum up:

          a. Physicalism was a good option before modern physics, but struggles to explain our consciousness.

          b. Solipsism can explain consciousness but struggles with realism, and doesn't generalize well

          c. Dualism is an illogical compromise to let us get on with business, as was the Copenhagen interpretation, i.e. a necessary "work-around".

          d. Virtualism is an unexplored logical possibility that science can evaluate, that has implications for the data we get from world we observe.

          Now, Conway shows logically that either the world, including us, is entirely mechanical, or if any part of it, like us, can be conscious (with free choice) then it must all be so [3]. In this view 2b and 2c attempt to "have ones cake and eat it too", leaving 2a and 2d as the only contenders.

          But can physicalism account for quantum theory? Everett's many worlds theory, that every quantum choice spawns an alternate universe, is the "way-out" case for 2a. It invents a multiverse machine to contain the quantum ghost's randomness, postulating a "clockwork multiverse", where no choice is ever really made. Yet why should an immense multi-verse, like a doting parent with a video-camera, copy everything our universe might do?

          The VR conjecture is the equally way-out case for 2d, that the quantum ghost is real and the physical world is its virtual shadow.

          Whether the world we see is an objective reality, that exists in and of itself, or a virtual reality, that is created by processing, is a hypothesis about it that science should be able to evaluate by facts plus logic.

          So now physics has two crazy, but consistent, explanations of the strange findings of modern physics to choose from. Lucky us.

          kind regards. Brian Whitworth

          References

          [1] B. Whitworth and T. Liu, "Politeness as a Social Computing Requirement," in Handbook of Conversation Design for Instructional Applications, R. Luppicini, Ed. Hershey PA: IGI, 2008, pp. 419-436.

          [2] B. Whitworth, "A Comparison of Human and Computer Information Processing," in Encyclopedia of Multimedia Technology and Networking, M. Pagani, Ed. Hershey PA: Information Science Reference, 2009, pp. 230-239, http://brianwhitworth.com/braincomputer.pdf

          [3] J. Conway and S. Koch, "The free will theorem," Found. Phys., vol. 36, no. 10, pp. arXiv:quant-ph/0604079v1, 2006.

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          • Post #15

          Dear Brian,

          Many thanks for your excellent essay. It makes sense to me and has given me a fresh way to look at the world and reality.

          I like the way your essay nicely explains some of the mysteries of Physics such as the Big Bang. I've always been unsatisfied with the view that what existed before the Big Bang was irrelevant. I know the conventional view is that even time was created in the Big Bang so such questions about "before" don't apply. BUT...as you say it can't just have arisen from nothing. You tie up lots of other loose ends nicely too. Well done!

          Marcel

          Just to advise the 'copy' function worked fine for me and it printed off ok.

          Brian

          I hope you didn't mind the 'assault'. Local Realism is also the key to my own thesis.

          I think I've discovered we have a problem holding more than a couple of 'moving' variables in our minds and evaluating interactions with other variables - at one time. (then scaling to analyse implications in the big picture).

          It's very 'virtual'. It seems our on board computers need a simple 'plug in' upgrade before we can fully understand inertial frames and curved space time. Once we see it, it's obvious.

          The variables are; Two co-moving reference frames (but with the co-ordinate systems "rigidly attached to a body' as Einstein specified. An observer either in one or other of the frames (with transition in either direction) or transitioning with the light (or transitioning body). Then, different n values for the different media (each way!). Then consider f / lambda / 'c' and E in each case. Maths can only do it once we get the conception correct. I think the closest we've got so far is the integro-differential equations of Ewald-Oseen extinction, but they are still 2 functions and some variable short of the full picture.

          I had to give up pure maths and train 7 years as an Architect to learn to think in a different enough way to hold it all in a mental matrix and manipulate it.

          Anyway, the result is local reality, quantum relativity, and a stream of answers.

          Do you fancy having a try at it? I promise it's worth it.

          Best wishes

          Peter

            Brian,

            I agree with many things you say, arguments you use, questions you ask. But by drawing a conjecture, you are not required to really look for any answer. Just speculate about it. I like your illustrations and your long bibliography. Just for the record, If you were to find the ultimate understanding of the universe, it would be so radical that, most likely, you would have no bibliography, no citation available to you. You would have not only to explain it, but also have to train the reader into thinking very differently. That is the hard part and you have done good on that, for your conjecture.

            Marcel,

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              • Post #18

              Brian,

              Why shouldn't "... an immense multiverse ... copy everything that our universe might do"?

              After all, if "our" universe and "the" multiverse are disjoint, there doesn't seem to be anything that prevents replication and a subsequent new initial condition for "the" history of a subset of the multiverse independent of "our" history.

              OTOH, if there is communication among the universes of a multiverse, I can see that reality could not be other than virtual, because histories are malleable. I'm thinking of that movie "Inception" -- where the only connection between the dreaming subject and reality is a single code symbol known only to the subject. I get it.

              The rub is, if our universe is not independent of the multiverse (implying time reversal symmetry between universes), I can't see a role for gravity. While we know that classical gravity requires conservation of time symmetry, I think that quantum gravity by information models (e.g., Jacobson-Verlinde, 't Hooft) need imply information entropy and thus some information loss. This would obviate reversibility on the classical-quantum boundary where maximum decoherence implies the lowest energy state for every subset of the multiverse, in which case "our" universe cannot dynamically interact with "the" multiverse. The worlds are disjoint, bounded in space and unbounded in time.

              Tom

              Dear Edwin,

              You are right, the issue of localism is central.

              I don't think Bell's logic is flawed. Take the simplest case. A Caesium atom sends off two photons in opposite directions with unknown spin. Define "en route" as being from that event until either photon is involved in any physical event. So traveling through space, air or glass is "en route", but any physical interaction, like measuring its spin, is not en route. So if the apparatus has ANY physical effect, the photon is no longer en route. However it could, as you say, affect the photon's "hidden properties" which then become evident later when spin is measured. This is also what Einstein thought, so you are in good company here.

              To evaluate this, note that photon spin is a binary outcome, with only two values, "up" or "down", for clockwise or anti-clockwise direction, and always by the same amount, which is Planck's reduced constant. That the spin outcome is probabilistic does not mean it is "changing", except if by that you mean entirely and totally reversing spin direction as it moves. So a photon is not like some cork on a quantum sea that continuously changes position as it bobs up and down. It is like a trap that irreversibly snaps shut the moment anything physically touches it, and does so clockwise or anti-clockwise randomly, i.e. not determined by prior physical events.

              In entanglement, two such traps set off in opposite directions, and we find that if one snaps shut one way, the always goes the other way. So if the "apparatus" causes hidden "changes", why does it always change one up and the other down? Also the entangled photons can travel light years in empty space before the measurement, why does the "apparatus" of empty space push one up and the other down, as space is isotropic? It doesn't make sense.

              In addition, the quantum collapse of the two-slit experiment implies the same "non-locality" when only one photon hits a screen with no apparatus except space, as follows:

              "To Einstein, quantum collapse was absurd, as it implied faster than light travel. In his thought experiment a photon travels through a slit to hit a screen. Before it hits, the wave function says it could exist at points say A or B on the screen with some probability. After it hits, it is suddenly entirely at point A say, and not at point B at all. Now as the screen moves further away, the wave projection increases until eventually the A to B distance could be light years. Yet in quantum theory, the collapse is still immediate. The moment point A "knows" it is the particle, then B "knows" it is not, even if they are in different galaxies. The collapse decision is applied faster than the speed of light, which by special relativity is impossible for any known form of physical transmission." (from my Ch3, p16)

              In contrast, the VR conjecture requires this non-locality, as a program acting upon a screen is always non-local to that screen. As you look at the screen to read this posting the program creating takes the same time to change any pixel - it has no screen limits. This of course is assuming that the physical world is an image on a screen, which is just a conjecture.

              Your idea of a C field is remarkably similar to the idea of a grid. The main difference is that fields are presumed continuous while a grid is presumed discrete. You say that "superposition of states inherently does away with realism in favor of mysticism, claiming that quantum objects are 'ghostly' until measured".

              I argue that it only does away with physical realism, but not realism per se. When you say we still do not know what a quantum field is I add "physically". We know what it is mathematically. If one defines postulating anything "beyond the physical" as "mystical", then both quantum theory and your C field are so already. The VR conjecture is just saying the same thing, but more bluntly, and without a "cover" of mathematics.

              To me, logically, physics left the enclave of positivism long ago, when it embraced Faraday's idea of a field, which Feynman defines as follows:

              "A real field is a mathematical function we use for avoiding the idea of action at a distance. " (Feynman, Leighton, & Sands, 1977) Vol. II, p15-7

              We don't "see" fields, just their effects, and what is action at a distance but non-locality? I like fields, but lets be honest - they are not positivist "things" perceived directly.

              So while "The physical fact is that a magnetic field can only measure along one axis at once", the quantum fact is that it can go both ways at once. This is why quantum computing operates quite differently from our physical computing.

              This model is the testable theory that the physical world is virtual, i.e. has the properties of a processing output. What processing creates it can be derived by reverse engineering, if it is consistent. Other than that, how to describe it is open. So your C field could be a fine way to do that, and perhaps a better one, as it allows mathematics.

              regards

              Brian

              Dear Tom,

              There is no reason why it couldn't be, in theory. Indeed, as I say, it is THE case for physicalism, given the strange findings of quantum mechanics. Many respected physicists consider it the best option.

              But science works by comparing alternatives and deciding the most likely, not by absolutely deciding "truth". So that it is not impossible is not the question, but rather whether it is likely. Here is a case from (Whitworth, 2010), p31:

              "While initially ignored, physicists today prefer it (many worlds theory) three to one over the Copenhagen view (Tegmark & Wheeler, 2001) p6, despite its staggering overheads. Billions of galaxies of photons, electrons and quarks each making billions of choices a second for billions of years means the:

              ". . . universe of universes would be piling up at rates that transcend all concepts of infinitude." (Walker, 2000) p107.

              Many worlds theory offends Occam's razor by assuming more than it explains. Deutsch's attempt to rescue it by letting a finite number of universes "repartition" after each choice just recovers the original problem, as what decides which universes are dropped?"

              Is MWT just a theory designed to support a pre-existent bias that the world is an objective reality? Does it add any value, apart from that?

              In contrast, in the VR conjecture, what is "copied" are quantum entities, like photons, or more correctly, their processing is distributed non-locally. This is a lot simpler than copying the entire universe every time a quantum event occurs!

              regards,

              Brian

              Tegmark, M., & Wheeler, J. A. (2001). 100 Years of the Quantum. Scientific American, (Feb), p68-75.

              Walker, E. H. (2000). The Physics of Consciousness. New York: Perseus Publishing.

              Whitworth, B. (2010). The Light of Existence. Available at http://brianwhitworth.com/BW-VRT3.pdf