One philosophical result of John Bell's choice of measurement space is a school called "super-determinism," which maintains that deterministic theories imply the absence of free will. Bell addressed the issue in a BBC interview with Paul Davies in 1985:*
"There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will. Suppose the world is super-deterministic, with not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork, but with our behavior, including our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment rather than another, absolutely predetermined, including the 'decision' by the experimenter to carry out one set of measurements rather than another, the difficulty disappears. There is no need for a faster than light signal to tell particle A what measurement has been carried out on particle B, because the universe, including particle A, already 'knows' what that measurement, and its outcome, will be."
I think that believers in Bell's result (i.e., quantum configuration space cannot be mapped to physical space without a nonlocal model) tend to falsely associate Joy's measurement framework with superdetermism and the absence of free will. This is true only if one identifies "free will" with the choice of an experimenter to decide what measurement criteria to use.
Joy's measurement framework does not constitute a superdeterministic theory -- indeed, the experimenter's choice is irrelevant, because the experimenter is only another element of nature's choice. That Bell characterizes nature as "inanimate" betrays an ontological bias toward particle reality (and probability), while Joy's epistemic framework allows no bias of nature toward a predetermined outcome. The experimenter has just as much free will as the external reality.
*Picked up from a Wikipedia article which continues:
"Superdeterminism has also been criticized because of perceived implications regarding the validity of science itself. For example, Anton Zeilinger has commented:
'[W]e always implicitly assume the freedom of the experimentalist... This fundamental assumption is essential to doing science. If this were not true, then, I suggest, it would make no sense at all to ask nature questions in an experiment, since then nature could determine what our questions are, and that could guide our questions such that we arrive at a false picture of nature.'"
Joy's framework explicitly verifies that nature does *not* determine the questions, nor the outcome. It is perfectly consistent with John Wheeler's participatory universe ("The situation cannot declare itself until you've asked your question. But the asking of one question precludes the asking of another."). The initial condition of the continuous measurement function is indifferent to which element of nature, the experimenter or the classicly random outcome, decides the question.
Tom